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A vigilance experiment was performed to evaluate the ef-
fect of monetary incentives on visual monitoring performance.
The vigilance task was the detection of a slightly larger ex-
cursion of a voltmeter needle making 50 uniform excursions
per minute. The length of the vigil was 4 8 minutes, during
which 32 signals were presented. Ten subjects (Ss) in a con-
trol group performed the task without possibility of reward.
A second group of 10 S_s performed the identical task receiv-
ing monetary rewards based on performance. Subjects receiv-
ing monetary rewards (M) detected significantly more signals
(p < .001) than did the control group (NM) . A significant
time decrement (p < .001) and a significant interaction be-
tween group and time existed (p < .001) . The detectability
(d') or sensitivity for the signals remained essentially in-
variant for both groups, although slightly greater for group
M, and the criterion level (beta) was comparatively lower for
group M. The cost factors were effective in manipulating
monitoring performance.
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I. • INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Extensive research has been conducted concerning vigi-
lance tasks in which man is required to detect randomly and
infrequently occurring events. The vast majority of this
effort has been concerned with discovering what physical-task
parameters may be responsible for vigilance decrement, i.e.
the decrease in vigilance performance. Recently, however,
some attention has been devoted to motivation as the key to
understanding vigilance behavior. A catalyst precipitating
this line of reasoning was the fact that performance improved
with "knowledge of results", i.e. telling subjects (Ss) when
correct detections and false alarms were made. (Wiener 1963,
and others) . In actual monitored systems, however, knowledge
of results would be unavailable, or at best extremely delayed.
If the feedback circuitry, human or electronic, were capable
of providing immediate knowledge of results, the occurrence
of a signal would have to be known, and the need for a human
monitor would be eliminated.
Several other methods of motivation have been attempted
with varying degrees of success. Baker, Kowal and Ware (1964)
pointed out that experimenter (E) attitude toward the Ss sig-
nificantly affected their performance on a vigilance task.
Several studies (Pollack and Knaff, 1958; Sipowica, Ware and
Baker, 1962; Bergum and Lehr, 1964; Levine, 1966; and Smith,
Lucaccini and Epstein, 1967) have employed monetary incentives
to increase motivation.
Pollack and Knaff (1958) reported a slight improvement
in detection performance when Ss were given the incentive of
"an extra hour of pay" for either 100 percent detection in
seven of eight 10-minute periods or the greatest improvement
in scores over previous tests. Subjects were guaranteed pay
for 50 hours of service and the incentive of "an extra hour
of pay" was not quantified.
Sipowicz et al . (1962); Bergum and Lehr (1964); Levine
(1966) ; and Smith et al . (1967) all provided rewards in pro-
portion to the number of targets detected, minus varying
punishments for missed signals and false alarms. All experi-
ments yielded some degree of improvement in results as com-
pared to a non-motivated group.
These monetary incentives were, however, subjectively
arrived at. Classifications such as "low incentive", "medium
incentive", and "high incentive" were used in a subjective
manner. Utility and/or decision theory may be used to help
quantify the experimental incentives used.
Utility theory suggests that the costs and values of de-
ciding whether or not a signal is present can be illustrated
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S = signal present S = no signal present
R = response R = no response
tt = a priori probability of no signal being present
tt, = a priori probability of a signal being present
EV = expected value (average utility) of decision
Tne +'s and -*s represent the utility points associated with
a particular action. The S theoretically would seek to maxi-
mize his EV and therefore one should assign incentives such
that A is positive and A > B. If, for example, A = -2 and
B = 3, S would decide to "not respond". However, Galanter
(1962) found that at best a logrithmic relationship existed
between money and utility, making the assignment of utility
points very difficult.
A second approach is to use the statistical tool of deci-
sion theory, and by applying one of the developed criteria
for an optimum decision rule, arrive at the proper costs to
apply in order to minimize the risk of making a decision.
Direct application of the above two approaches would be
very difficult however, since, as shown by Egan, Greenberg
and Scnulman (1961); Weiner, Poock and Steel (1964) as re-
analyzed by Taylor (1965) ; Levine (1966) ; and others, the
vigilance decrement is not due to a change in the efficiency
of the S's senses but rather a shift in the S's criterion for
response in the direction of greater conservatism. In other
words, the detectability of the signal remains constant, but
it is the S's criterion that changes. This means that the S's
utility decision matrix or the costs and/or the probabilities
of a signal being present, change with time. Thus the S's
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decision rule changes as a function of time. Deese's expect-
ancy theory (Deese 1955) states, in brief, that the likelihood
that the subject will respond to a randomly occurring signal
depends upon his expectancy about the appearance of a signal.
This expectancy is built up as a kind of "averaging process"
based on past signals, implying that to the observer, the
probabilities of signal presence change with time. Several
studies (Jerison, Pickett and Stenson, 1965; and Mackworth
,
196 8) found that an increased signal rate did actually de-
crease the probability of detection.
This study will assume fixed a priori probabilities in
order to isolate the effect of monetary costs on motivation,
and ultimately vigilance performance. However, additional
research in support of Deese's theory certainly seems
warranted.
The current study will attempt to decrease the vigilance
decrement by inducing motivation through statistical assign-
ment of the costs of the decision parameters in order to
optimize the observer's decision criterion. These costs of
the decision parameters will be constant, although further
study should be made to determine the significance of this
type of value assignment.
In order to manipulate the costs of making a decision as
a function of time in a laboratory environment, a procedure
similar to knowledge of results would have to be employed.
Therefore this study will assign fixed costs to the decision
parameters. Although internal inhibition or caution apparently
increases with time, when a S does become more reluctant to
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respond to the presence of a signal his non-optimal payoff
should dictate that he is no longer maximizing the expected
value of his decision rule and the inhibition should dissipate.
Thus, the S_ should return to the original decision costs.
Signal detection theory (Green and Swets , 1966) was ap-
plied in the current experiment. This theory is based on the
concept that signals are detected against a background of
"noise". This noise represents random variations in the chan-
nel through which the signal reaches the decision function.
Any specific observation may come from one of two populations,
either noise alone or noise plus a signal, and the observer
must decide whether or not he will accept that observation as
a signal. The difference between the means of the distribu-
tions of the two populations, noise and signal plus noise, is
the detectability of the signal. When the two distributions
are Gaussian and of equal variance, the difference between
the means divided by the standard deviation is designated d 1 .
The measure of the sensitivity of the observer for the sig-
nal is independent of his decision criterion. The decision
criterion is measured by the parameter 3 , where the accept-
ance region for a positive response consists of all events
whose likelihood ratios are equal to or greater than 3. An
increase in 3 indicates an increase in caution by the
observer.




is essentially constant as verified for the Jump Clock
Test by Mackworth (196 8) and in general by Loeb and Benfold
(1964) and Levine (1966) .
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The costs for the decision parameters were calculated
using the Neyman-Pearson decision rule which yields a specific
likelihood ratio value, 3, for a specified a priori probabil-
ity of false alarms (see Selin, 1965, Chapter 2). This spe-
cific value of 3 was then used in the Bayesian decision
criterion in order to obtain a ratio of the costs for the
decision parameters. The Bayes criterion consists of minimiz-
ing average cost when the a priori probabilities are known
and the average cost is a linear function of the absolute
error probabilities (see Selin, 1965, Chapter 2). By assign-
ing a specific value to the probability of false alarms
(a = .05) ultimately a ratio of costs can be determined. In
other words the decision maker is maximizing the acceptance
of a signal when there is a signal present, while holding a
constant probability of false alarms.
The actual calculations are as follows:
f(x|s) = p.d.f. of signal plus noise
f(x|n) = p.d.f. of noise alone
C
nn
= cost of correct rejection
C~, = cost of miss
C, , = cost of correct detection
C10 = cost °f false alarm
7T
n
= a priori probability of no
signal being present
7T, = a priori probability of a
signal being present
a = probability of false alarm
3 = critical value of likelihood ratio
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Assume f(x|n) is N(0,1) and f(x|s) is N(us,l); then for
this case, by signal detection theory:
a = J a f (x | n) dx
P
This experiment will assume a = .05 (3 = 1.645 (from table of
normal distributions)
.









and it, were determined from the experimental target pre-





rearranging the above known values yields
(C -C )
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The theory thus yields an infinite number of possible combina-
tions that satisfy the above ratio. For this experiment, the
following combination of values was chosen:


















implicitly indicates some form of utility assessment. It is
recommended that a further study be conducted using various
ranges of costs with a fixed ratio, 3, to determine if there
is any significant difference in performance as a result of
the variation of the assigned costs of the decision parameters
As stated, human behavioral theory sometimes suggests that
subjective probability, not a priori probability, and utility,
not monetary value, determine the S's decision. If we assume
nonlinear transformations of the values of the decision pa-
rameters and of the a priori probabilities, the maximization
of the subjective value would still have the form illustrated
above. The only thing that would change would be the value
of 3. The likelihood ratio criterion would still be the op-




The monitoring task consisted of the detection of an ab-
normally large deflection of a voltmeter needle which made
50 deflections per minute. The normal deflection and the
signal were produced by electrically energizing the meter.
The signals were programmed on a paper tape and stepped
through an Ohr-tronics 8-channel tape reader at a rate of 50
characters per minute. Each character produced either the
short background deflection of 25-degrees, or a signal, a
32-degree deflection. The impulses appeared on a meter con-
sisting of a uniform white background and a black needle.
The impulse circuit and damping characteristic of the meters
were such that the impulse appeared as a rapid rise and fall
of the needle with no pause or "bounce" at the peak, or bot-
tom. The needle returned to its resting position before the
next deflection. The S responded by pressing a silent hand
switch which activated a pen on a Lafayette Model 5040 multi-
pen recorder. Signals were also automatically recorded in
the same manner. Subjects wore earphones which played white
noise at about 60 db to further assure auditory isolation.
A schedule of 32 signals for the 4 8-minute run was deter-
mined from a table of uniformly distributed random numbers.
The only restrictions on randomness were that the minimum
inter-signal interval was 0.3 minutes and that 8 signals would
appear on each 12 minute block.
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B. SUBJECTS
The Ss were 20 military officer graduate students at the
Naval Postgraduate School. None had served previously in
monitoring studies.
C. PROCEDURE
The Ss were randomly divided into Group NM (non-motivated)
and Group M (motivated) , consisting of 10 Ss each. Identical
instructions were read to each S at the beginning of the ex-
periment explaining the nature of the task and the response
procedure. In addition, Group M was given an explanation of
the cost incentive matrix. This explanation included the
fact that it was possible to earn between 10 and 15 dollars
for a perfect performance. A maximum effort actually yielded
$12.72, a conversion of .75 cents per cost matrix point. How-
ever, to insure against any knowledge of signal presentation,
the previously mentioned dollar range was given. A practice
session consisting of 9 signals in rapid order followed in
which knowledge of results was given. The E warned the Ss
that the signals would not appear so rapidly in the actual
experiment. The S was asked to remove his watch and the task
was then begun with no interruptions permitted.
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III. RESULTS
A response within 2.0 seconds after presentation of a
signal was scored as a detection; all other responses were
scored as false alarms. Figure 1 shows the mean percentage
of signals detected as a function of time periods for both
groups. These raw detection percentages were transformed to
radians by the arcsine transformation in order to satisfy
the normal distribution requirement for analysis of variance.
A nested-factorial analysis of variance was performed on the
radians, with Ss nested into groups but common to the four
time periods, see Table I. The difference between groups was
significant, F(l,18) = 16.43, p < .001, with the motivated
group detecting a higher mean percentage of signals, Group M
86.9%, Group NM 68.5%. The analysis showed a significant
decrement over time periods, F(3,54) = 7.80, p < .001, as
shown in Figure 1. A significant interaction existed between
groups and time periods, F(3,54) = 8.50, p < .001, due to a
significantly higher percentage of detections by the motivated
group than the non-motivated group.
Figure 2 displays the mean percentage of false alarms as
a function of time periods for both groups. The percentage
of false alarms was calculated utilizing the fact that it was
possible to have 592 false alarms per 12-minute block, i.e.
600 deflections minus 8 signals. A non-parametric median
test, designed to measure whether the two independent groups
differ in central tendency, indicated there was no significant
19
TABLE I




Groups (g) 1 5.6196 16.434 <.001






3 1.5362 7.795 <.001




difference between the means of the two groups at the 0.001
level,
x.
2 (1) = .051, p < .001. The experimental range of
percentage of false alarms, 3.6 to 1.0, approximated the a
priori percentage of false alarms, .05.
The calculation of d', the statistical difference or dis-
tance between the means of the signal and signal plus noise
distributions of equal variance, was obtained from a table
compiled by Elliot (Swets , 1964) , using mean percentages of
signals detected and of false alarms per group per time per-
iod as suggested by Mackworth (1968)
.
The parameter 3 was calculated by evaluating the likeli-
hood ratio at the points indicated by the mean percentages of
signals detected and of false alarms, i.e. evaluate the ratio
of the normal probability density functions f (x| s) /f (x|n)
.
The experimental values of the d' and 3 parameters for
both groups are shown in Figure 3. These results indicate
that d' remained essentially invariant for both groups, being
slightly greater for group M; while except for time period 1
where 3 was approximately equal for both groups, 3 increased
more rapidly with the NM group. This indicates that the
detectability of the signals was approximately equal for both
groups but, after the first time period the NM group was
comparatively more reluctant to respond to a signal.
Taylor (1965) indicated that 3 itself does not measure
the placement of the criterion on the scaled log-likelihood-
ratio axis, but rather the parameter (log 3)/d' should be
evaluated. The decision need not be based on likelihood
21
ratio per se, but the decision rule must be equivalent to a
likelihood-ratio criterion in order for the relationship,
d P(x|s)/d P(x|n) = -f (x| s) /-f (x|n) = likelihood ratio, to
exist (Green and Swets, 1966). A plot of (log 3)/d', Figure
4, indicates the same trend as 3 in Figure 3.
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IV. DISCUSSION
The results of this study provide support for the hypoth-
esis that when motivation is increased by monetary incentives,
performance in a simple vigilance task can be significantly
enhanced. This is pointed out by the fact that the mean per-
centage of signals detected, 86.9%, by the motivated group
(M) was significantly higher than the mean percentage of sig-
nals detected, 68.5%, by the non-motivated group (NM) . Sim-
ilar results were reported by Pollack and Knaff (1958) ;
Sipowicz et al. (1962) ; Bergum and Lehr (1964) ; Levine (1966)
;
and Smith et al. (1967) .
The hypothesis that the detectability of the signal, d 1
,
is essentially constant was supported. For the first time
period, d 1 was equal for both groups. During the remaining
three time periods a slight overall rise in d 1 was found for
the motivated group and a slight decrement for the non-
motivated group.
The decision criterion, as measured by beta, showed an
increase in caution for both groups during each time block.
During the first time block, beta was essentially the same
for both groups. However, for the three remaining time blocks,
beta increased more rapidly for the non-motivated group.
This is consistent with the fact that the motivated group
performed significantly better than the non-motivated group.
The signal detection theory analysis of the results is
consistent with those resulting from the analysis of variance.
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Signal detection theory states that the significant difference
in performance between the two groups resulted from the fact
that the non-motivated group was more reluctant to respond to
a signal when one occurred, while the detectability of the
signals was essentially the same for both groups.
It is recommended that in future studies utilizing mon-
etary incentives a statistical evaluation of decision costs
be conducted using decision theory and a Bayesian type deci-
sion criterion. The statistical procedure used in this study
not only provides a statistically determined cost ratio but
also allows the E to choose an a priori probability of false
alarms
.
In summary, the performance in a simple vigilance task
was significantly enhanced when motivation was increased by
statistically calculated monetary incentives. The theory
that the detectability of the signal remains essentially
constant and that the increase in caution with time is
responsible for the vigilance decrement was supported. It
is believed that a theoretical model of vigilance behavior



















FIGURE 1: MEAN PERCENTAGE OF SIGNALS










FIGURE 2 : MEAN PERCENTAGE OF FALSE







FIGURE 3: THE QUANTITIES d 1 AND 3
















FIGURE 4: THE QUANTITY (LOG 3)/d'
AS A FUNCTION OF TIME
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A vigilance experiment was performed to evaluate the ef-
fect of monetary incentives on visual monitoring performance.
The vigilance task was the detection of a slightly larger ex-
cursion of a voltmeter needle making 50 uniform excursions
per minute. The length of the vigil was 4 8 minutes, during
which 32 signals were presented. Ten subjects (Ss) in a con-
trol group performed the task without possibility of reward.
A second group of 10 Ss performed the identical task receiv-
ing monetary rewards based on performance. Subjects receiv-
ing monetary rewards (M) detected significantly more signals
(P < .001) than did the control group (NM) . A significant
time decrement (p < .001) and a significant interaction be-
tween group and time existed (p < .001). The detectability
(d 1 ) or sensitivity for the signals remained essentially in-
variant for both groups, although slightly greater for group
M, and the criterion level (beta) was comparatively lower for
group M. The cost factors were effective in manipulating
monitoring performance.
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